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Taxonomy of Minority Governments 
 
LISA LA FORNARA 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 A minority government in its most basic form is a government in which the party holding 
the most parliamentary seats still has fewer than half the seats in parliament and therefore cannot 
pass legislation or advance policy without support from unaffiliated parties.1 Because seats in 
minority parliaments are more evenly distributed amongst multiple parties, opposition parties have 
greater opportunity to block legislation. A minority government must therefore negotiate with 
external parties and adjust its policies to garner the majority of votes required to advance its 
initiatives.2  
 This paper serves as a taxonomy of minority governments in recent history and proceeds 
in three parts. First, it provides a working definition of minority governments, explains the 
different types of minority governments, and identifies how minority governments relate to 
coalition governments. Second, the paper explores the ways minority governments form, including 
the various ways they take power and the types of electoral systems likely to produce them. Finally, 
the paper examines the relationship between minority governments and constitutional design, 
primarily focusing on the role of first past the post and proportional representation electoral 
systems and semi-presidential executive systems. Ultimately, this taxonomy asserts that a 
democractic instability is neither a cause nor an effect of the formation of minority governments: 
                                                          
 Juris Doctor Candidate, 2018, Indiana University Maurer School of Law; Bachelor of Arts, 2015, Canisius 
College. I am endlessly thankful to Professors Susan and David Williams for their inspiration and guidance in the 
production of this Note. 
1 D. Kwavnick & Stephen Azzi, Minority Government, CANADIAN ENCYCLOPEDIA, 
http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/minority-government/ (last updated Oct. 23, 2015). 
2 See R.G., How Minority Government Works, ECONOMIST: ECONOMIST EXPLAINS (May 6, 2015, 11:50 PM), 
https://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2015/05/economist-explains-7; Jonathan Boston & Andrew 
Ladley, Efficient Secrets: The Craft of Coalition Management, 4 N.Z. J. PUB. & INT’L L. 55, 69 (2006). 
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minority governments are not a sign of democratic failure and do not threaten a country’s 
democratic performance. 
I.  GENERAL INFORMATION 
 The separation of powers between various government branches is often cited as a key 
protector of democracy against authoritarian rule. One such crucial partition is the constitutional 
separation of authority between the executive and legislative branches, with contemporary 
democracies adhering to either a presidential or parliamentary system.3 Presidential systems 
maintain a strict separation of powers between the legislative and executive branches, with each 
branch holding the other accountable in its entirety. In contrast, parliamentary systems are unified 
or fused systems in which the chief executive is elected by and accountable to the legislature.4 The 
chief executive, often called the prime minister, has the authority to dissolve the legislature and 
call an election;5 in such circumstances, however, the prime minister is also ousted from office.6  
 For a legislature to effectively perform its constitutional functions, it must be able to 
consistently muster legislative majorities in support of legislation, budgetary bills, and official 
appointments.7 Maintaining a legislative majority is especially important to parliamentary 
legislatures, which are vulnerable to motions of no confidence and can lose control of the prime 
ministership. Elections do not always produce strict party majorities; therefore, after such 
elections, parliamentary parties may join together to form a majority coalition. In some 
                                                          
3 For a full explanation of the differences between presidential and parliamentary systems with regard to the 
separation of powers, electoral design, and legislative efficiency, see Richard Albert, The Fusion of Presidentialism 
and Parliamentarism, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 531 (2009).  
4 KAARE STRØM, MINORITY GOVERNMENT AND MAJORITY RULE, 3–4 (1990). 
5 Michael Laver, Legislatures or Parliaments in Comparative Contexts?, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL 
ECONOMY 121, 124 (Barry R. Weingast & Donald Wittman eds., 2008). 
6  General elections are held after a parliament is dissolved and all selected representatives must form a new 
government. See Dissolution of Parliament, INTERNATIONAL IDEA 2, 4 (May 2016), 
http://www.constitutionnet.org/sites/default/files/dissolution_of_parliament_final.pdf. 
7 STRØM, supra note 4, at 5. 
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circumstances, however, a plurality party or group of parties may opt to proceed as a relative 
majority, thereby forming a minority government.8   
 A minority government differs from a majority coalition government because, unlike 
traditional coalition governments where two or more parties formally join together, outside parties 
in minority governments may support the plurality party while retaining their independence.9 Thus, 
the government remains a minority for the duration of its tenure10 and must rely on other parties 
to pass intended legislation.11 These two concepts are not mutually exclusive and it is possible for 
a government to be controlled by a minority coalition. In such cases, minority parties create a 
formal coalition but still hold fewer than half of the parliamentary seats.12 Interestingly, the 
governing minority coalition does not always contain the party that holds an individual plurality. 
Rather, the process allows for like-minded, small parties to displace larger or plurality parties and 
take control of the government.13 
                                                          
8 In most parliamentary democracies, minority governments are less common than majority governments but 
nowhere near as rare as nonpartisan governments, in which “cabinet members do not act as party representatives 
(even though they may hold party memberships). . .” Id. at 7. In fact, several studies have shown that approximately 
one-third of post-war governments have held minority status. Id. at 8. 
9 Jon Stone, What is a Minority Government? How is it Different to a Coalition?, INDEPENDENT (May 7, 2015, 3:54 
PM), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/generalelection/minority-government-coalitions-prime-
minister-government-snp-labour-conservative-lib-dem-10232801.html. 
10 In these systems, any party or coalition of parties—regardless of whether the party or coalition constitutes a 
minority or a majority of the legislature—can take power so long as the proposed government passes an investiture 
vote. For a discussion on how investiture rules affect the formation of minority governments, see discussion infra 
Section II.A.  
11 See Boston & Ladley, supra note 2, at 89. Minority governments can occur absent special rules permitting them. 
Israel is an exception in that it does not permit traditional minority coalitions to govern. To be recognized absent an 
absolute majority, a party must either be part of an oversized coalition or a minimal winning coalition. An oversized 
coalition exists where two or more parties’ strength exceeds the number necessary for a parliamentary majority. The 
defining feature of an oversized coalition is that, if one of the partners leaves the coalition, the coalition does not 
lose its status as the majority government. A minimal winning coalition is made up of parties whose combined 
strength ensures more than half of parliament. In a minimal winning coalition, a partner’s withdrawal from the 
coalition destroys the coalition’s majority. Ofer Kenig, Coalition Building in Israel: A Guide for the Perplexed, ISR. 
DEMOCRACY INST. (Feb. 18, 2013), https://en.idi.org.il/articles/10248. 
12 See generally André Kaiser, MMP, Minority Governments and Parliamentary Opposition, 7 N.Z. J. PUB. & INT’L. 
L. 77 (2009) (identifying potential factors to explain why New Zealand has been governed by multiple minority 
coalition governments). 
13 Minority coalitions have held power in countries such as Ireland, Denmark, New Zealand, and the Netherlands. 
See infra Appendix, pp. 37, 40–41, 43–46, 53–54.  
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A. Types of Minority Governments 
 In addition to single-party minority governments and minority coalitions, there are two 
primary types of minority governments: substantive minority governments and formal minority 
governments. A substantive minority government is supported by a pre-negotiated agreement 
between the governing party or coalition and one or more outside support parties.14 A substantive 
minority’s defining feature is that, even counting the contracted allegiance, the governing party or 
coalition remains a minority.15 In this form of government, the outside party is not considered to 
be part of a coalition with the governing party or parties. The inter-party agreement is not a general 
commitment to support the government on all policies; the parties’ commitments are specific to 
the particular areas detailed in the agreement.16 Accordingly, substantive minority governments 
may have alliances with various opposition parties and such alliances are often ideologically, 
rather than procedurally, focused.17  
 In contrast, a formal minority government negotiates a permanent agreement with one or 
more external support parties. These parties give a general commitment to support the government 
                                                          
14 Such agreements can be written, unwritten, or confined to one or many policy areas. They are referred to as 
legislative agreements, forligs in Denmark, or cooperation agreements in New Zealand. OIREACHTAS LIB. & RES. 
SERV., Minority Governments and Parliament 4 (Oct. 4, 2016), 
https://www.oireachtas.ie/parliament/media/housesoftheoireachtas/libraryresearch/lrsnotes/LRSNote_MinorityGove
rnments_Final_4_October_2016_111130.pdf. 
15 STRØM, supra note 4, at 62. 
16 OIREACHTAS LIB. & RES. SERV., supra note 14. 
17 Id. This emphasis on ideology was evident in Denmark’s 2015 minority government, led by Lars Lokke 
Rasmussen and the Liberal Party. Although the Liberal Party tried to form a center-right coalition, policy divisions 
with three other right-leaning parties prevented the coalition’s formal establishment. The second largest 
parliamentary party, the anti-immigrant Danish People’s Party, declined to formally join the Liberals on account of 
ideological differences regarding taxes, social spending, and the European Union. Further, despite its efforts to form 
a right-leaning coalition, one of the Liberal Party’s first acts was to reintroduce a tax break for home improvements, 
a policy supported by two leftist parties. Denmark’s New Government: Coalition of One, ECONOMIST (July 2, 2015), 
http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21656723-centre-right-liberals-depend-far-right-party-bigger-themselves-
coalition-one. 
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in return for government commitments on specific policy areas or procedures.18 Unlike with 
substantive minority governments, a formal minority’s outside support provides the government 
with the additional seats it needs to constitute a majority.19 Formal minority governments 
encourage the ruling party to appoint leaders from the supportive parties in executive positions as 
a way of rewarding the parties’ support and encouraging future loyalty.20 While formal agreements 
may provide increased stability, they also require a minority government to sacrifice more of its 
policy preferences and are more likely to involve concessions to support parties on issues that are 
unrelated to the issue in question.21 Although very similar to majority coalitions, supporting parties 
in formal minority governments are not officially bound to the ruling party or coalition and 
breaking this agreement will not destroy the government.22 Because the inter-party relationships 
in substantive and formal agreements are not binding in the same way a coalition’s inter-party 
relationships are, a minority government can employ more than one of these policies during its 
tenure.23  
                                                          
18 Such agreements are sometimes referred to as confidence and supply agreements, particularly in New Zealand, 
Ireland, and Scotland. The most institutionalized of these agreements have been termed contract parliamentarianism. 
OIREACHTAS LIB. & RES. SERV., supra note 14, at 5. 
19 STRØM, supra note 4, at 62. 
20 OIREACHTAS LIB. & RES. SERV., supra note 14, at 5. 
21 Id.  
22 Whether these agreements are formally binding depends on how institutionalized they become as well as the terms 
of the agreement. The support agreements that become highly institutionalized have been termed “contract 
parliamentarism.” Id at 4–5. These agreements are very broad and often explicitly exclude uninvolved parties; thus, 
they go beyond the more limited and fluid legislative accommodations that minority governments employ to create 
shifting coalitions that provide support on individual bills. These support agreements can be binding on the parties 
and representatives, such as the so-called “co-operation agreement” between New Zealand’s governing Labour party 
and United Future in 2002, which stated that the parties were expected to publicly support “any policy initiatives 
arising out of negotiations between them that led to ‘an agreed position.’” Contract parliamentarism is most often 
found in Sweden and New Zealand. Tim Bale & Torbjörn Bergman, Captives No Longer, But Servants Still?: 
Contract Parliamentarism and the New Minority Governance in Sweden and New Zealand, 41 GOV’T & OPPOSITION 
422, 430–32, 434 (2006).  
23 See OIREACHTAS LIB. & RES. SERV., supra note 14, at 4. 
 
 6 
 
 There is no theoretical or empirical consensus on whether a substantive or a formal 
minority government is the more effective strategy.24 An empirical analysis of minority 
governments in Spain—two of which were substantive and two of which were formal—found that 
both types of agreements allowed the government to pass approximately the same percentage of 
government bills.25 Empirical analysis of New Zealand and Sweden’s minority governments has 
similarly revealed little suggesting a substantial disparity between the different forms’ success 
rates.26 A study of one Spanish government, however, found that a small nationalist party 
benefitted from using both a substantive and a formal minority government system; though, 
empirically, it achieved slightly more during the latter relationship.27 Some analysts have further 
found that the more likely the government is to shift alliances on substantive policy issues, the 
greater the possibility that the minority government will achieve its preferred policy outcomes, 
seemingly encouraging substantive agreements.28  
 Accordingly, it seems clear that the most effective way to ensure a minority government’s 
survival and success is context-dependent and turns on the country’s party system, institutions, 
and procedure.29 For instance, minority governments that do not hold the parliament’s central 
policy position are in a weaker position and thus tend to seek formal support agreements over the 
shifting alliances associated with substantive minority systems.30  
B. Challenges Associated with Minority Governments 
                                                          
24 While effectiveness is a subjective term, most analysts use a set of indicators to assess the performance of 
governments. Such indicators include the proportion of the governing party or coalition’s bills the government 
manages to pass, the overall number of bills passed, and the government’s tenure and durability. Id. at 5.  
25 The substantive minority government passed eighty-eight percent of bills and the formal government passed 
approximately eighty-seven percent of bills. Id. 
26 Id. 
27 Id.  
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. at 6. 
 
 7 
 
 Minority governments face heightened challenges, as single-party minority governments 
and minority coalitions are subject to the same dangers and shortcomings as majority coalition 
governments but with a greater regularity of daunting outcomes. When a parliamentary coalition 
governs, party discipline is paramount because dissenting votes within the governing coalition’s 
membership threaten to destabilize the coalition itself.31 This is especially important in minority 
governments where each individual vote is crucial to the government’s ability to advance its 
initiatives. When determining which party alliances are necessary to pass legislation or preserve 
the government’s position, the governing coalition cannot afford internal discord and strongly 
relies on each coalition member to vote in favor of the proposed policies. Dissenting votes from 
within the governing parties thus severely undermine the government’s position and can be far 
more detrimental to a minority government than they would be to a majority government. Though 
party discipline is important in all minority governments, it is particularly relevant to minority 
coalitions where alliances must cross ideological lines, thereby introducing a wider range of beliefs 
and forcing the government to advance policies that are acceptable to all represented positions.32  
 Another consequence of coalition arrangements is that they may confer greater influence 
on smaller, regionalized parties.33 In highly divisive elections that threaten to withhold a majority 
result, smaller parties become increasingly important as they may determine the outcome of the 
election. Therefore, larger parties look to smaller parties as prospective coalition partners, paying 
particular attention to whether the smaller party’s ideology is positioned between multiple parties 
and whether the smaller party has enough support to push the larger parties into majority territory.34 
Accordingly, smaller parties’ interests and movements become increasingly important. By 
                                                          
31 Albert, supra note 3, at 568. 
32 See id.  
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
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refusing to form or join a minority government’s coalition, the smaller parties’ influence persists 
throughout the government’s tenure, as a failure to adequately appeal to the smaller parties may 
prove fatal to the governing parties. Similarly, even if the smaller party does join a minority 
coalition, larger parties still must take care to continuously cater to the smaller party’s ideas or risk 
dissenting votes from within the coalition. Thus, minority governments grant small parties more 
influence than they would otherwise possess. 
 Minority coalitions are further disadvantaged because they face the same challenges as 
majority coalitions without the benefit of a majority’s security. Because coalition governments 
have to invest resources in processes that otherwise would not be necessary, the various steps 
associated with building and sustaining coalitions may diminish legislative efficiency.35 It is 
widely acknowledged that “coalition governments face several challenges, including creating a 
coalition, managing the allocation of Cabinet portfolios, consulting with coalition parties and their 
respective pressure or interest groups, managing intra-coalition and inter-party disagreements, or 
shoring up legislative coalitions.”36 Coalition-building—which is one of the most important, and 
complex, elements of coalition governments—begins after the election, and the inter-party 
negotiations required to form the coalition can take months.37 These negotiations entail substantial 
expenses including bargaining costs,38 policy costs,39 and office costs.40  
 In some ways, minority governments resemble divided governments in presidential 
systems where the executive and the legislature are controlled by different parties. Both 
                                                          
35 Though this problem is slightly augmented in minority coalitions, it also burdens majority coalitions. Id. at 569. 
36 Id.  
37 Id. 
38 Bargaining costs refer to the time required to build a coalition and resolve subsidiary coalition matters. Id. 
39 Policy costs are associated with compromise and concession in developing a governing program. Id. 
40 Here, office costs refer to the payout or distribution of portfolios. Id. at 570. For a brief discussion on how these 
costs may affect a plurality party’s decision to form a coalition, see discussion infra Section III.A. 
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governments generally are inefficient in passing the governing party’s legislative agenda in full, 
and both disperse power in a similar fashion, affording both the governing and opposition parties 
the ability to meaningfully shape policy.41 Once formed, minority governments are constantly 
vulnerable to extemporaneous votes of no confidence, thus constraining the prime minister’s 
political agenda to shorter commitments and continuously keeping political parties prepared for 
elections.42  
 Because of the different governance styles the various types of government must adopt to 
work effectively, there is a notable difference between the categories’ tenures. In parliamentary 
democracies, a single party majority holds power for an average of thirty months, and coalitions 
retain power for an average of seventeen to eighteen months.43 Minority governments have the 
shortest tenure, averaging only thirteen to fourteen months.44 Ultimately, though minority 
governments serve the shortest terms, multiple studies have shown that minority governments do 
not threaten democratic stability, regardless of the constitutional system in which they emerge.45 
II.  THE FORMATION OF MINORITY GOVERNMENTS 
 Theoretically, minority governments may form in any parliamentary system; however, 
certain systemic prerequisites may affect the likelihood that a minority government will emerge. 
One such factor is the type of investiture rules present in the country as a means of allowing the 
government to formally take power, with negative investiture rules more easily lending themselves 
                                                          
41 Albert, supra note 3, at 565. 
42 Id. at 565–66. 
43 Paul Cairney, Coalition and Minority Government in Scotland: Lessons for the United Kingdom?, 82 POL. Q. 261, 
261 (2011). 
44 Id. 
45 E.g., STRØM, supra note 4, at 243–44. But see Robert Elgie & Petra Schleiter, Variation in the Durability of Semi-
Presidential Democracies, in SEMI-PRESIDENTIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 42, 47 (Robert Elgie, Sophia Moestrup & 
Yu-Shan Wu eds., 2011). 
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to the creation of minority governments. Other relevant factors are categorically included under 
the social and political context surrounding the pertinent elections.  
A.  The Role of Investiture Rules 
 Traditionally, coalition theorists have assumed that coalitions can only take power if they 
hold a legislative majority, but literature has shown that coalitions can be successful even if they 
control less than half of the legislature.46 An inclusive empirical investigation of government 
formation theories tested several hypotheses of government formation, including the position that 
“potential governments controlling a minority of seats in the legislature are less likely to form in 
the presence of an investiture vote.”47 This study seemingly confirmed the theory that minority 
governments are less likely to form in countries that require a government to pass an investiture 
vote before assuming power.48  
                                                          
46 See, e.g., TORBJÖRN BERGMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL RULES AND PARTY GOALS IN COALITION FORMATION: AN 
ANALYSIS OF WINNING MINORITY GOVERNMENTS IN SWEDEN 4 (1995) (stating that, when analyzing a minority 
coalition’s success, “The assumed threshold still is an absolute majority, but because a (implicit) distinction is made 
between containing an absolute majority and having the support of an absolute majority, minority governments are 
no longer such a remarkable puzzle in coalition theory.”) 
47 This study tested a total of 17 hypotheses in a sample of 220 coalition bargaining situations within 14 countries. 
Lanny W. Martin & Randolph T. Stevenson, Government Formation in Parliamentary Democracies, 45 AM. J. POL. 
SCIENCE 33, 37 (2001). 
48 Id. at 46. Systems that do not require the incoming government to pass investiture votes are considered to employ 
negative parliamentarism. Negative parliamentarism is a feature of government in which “parties can enter executive 
offices even without visible and explicit support from a majority of MPs. What a potential government coalition has 
to avoid is an active majority against it holding power.” Negative parliamentarism is a decision rule and often 
promotes minority government formation, as “it is easier to avoid being opposed by a majority than to gain support 
from a majority.” Natalia Ajenjo, Shane Martin, & Bjørn Erik Rasch, The Investiture Vote in Parliaments and 
Government Formation 1 (November 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Oslo-Rome International 
Workshop on Democracy, the Norwegian Institute in Rome), https://www.uio.no/english/research/interfaculty-
research-areas/democracy/news-and-events/events/seminars/2011/papers-roma-2011/Rome-InvestitureNA-SM-
BER.pdf. Negative parliamentarism encompasses negative investiture rules, discussed infra, with negative 
parliamentarism being more comprehensive and systemic as it is associated with other aspects of government 
formation and operation, such as agenda-setting powers. See Federico Russo & Luca Verzichelli, The Adoption of 
Positive and Negative Parliamentarism: Systemic or Idiosyncratic Differences 1–2 (April 2014) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with the European Consortium for Political Research), 
http://www.sv.uio.no/isv/english/research/projects/evolution-parliamentarism/events/seminars/ecpr-salamanca-
russoverzichelli.pdf. 
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 There are two different types of investiture rules—positive and negative—that allow a 
government to take power, only one of which requires a majority of votes in parliament. 49 The 
key underlying principle in a positive form is that a government should be supported by the 
parliament.50 Therefore, coalitions in countries that use these rules must win a vote by at least a 
relative majority.51 These rules form the basis of systems in Germany, Spain,52 Belgium, Ireland, 
Israel, and Italy.53 A negative formulation is a general default and operates on the principle that a 
government must merely be tolerated by the parliament. A negative system occurs in the absence 
of a requirement that a government be supported by parliament, thus defining the relationship 
between the government and the parliament in negative terms. This rule dates back to when the 
monarch, rather than the parliament, appointed the government and is found in states such as 
Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and the United Kingdom.54 In these countries, no 
vote of investiture is required; the Head of State formally appoints a Prime Minister and thereby 
appoints the government. This government retains power until it is removed via a vote of no 
confidence or voluntarily resigns.55   
                                                          
49 Torbjörn Bergman, Formation Rules and Minority Governments, 23 EUR. J. POL. RESEARCH 55, 57 (1993). 
50 Id. Bergman seemingly equates negative investiture rules with negative parliamentarism. See discussion supra 
note 48. 
51 Bergman, supra note 49. 
52 In Germany, a candidate for Chancellor is first appointed by the President. To assume power in a first vote of 
investiture this candidate, and thus the coalition he or she represents, must win more than half of the Bundestag’s 
votes. If the candidate fails on the first vote, the President can either appoint a Chancellor that has the support of a 
relative majority or dissolve the Bundestag. Steffen Ganghof & Christian Stecker, Investiture Rules in Germany: 
Stacking the Deck Against Minority Governments, in PARLIAMENTS AND GOVERNMENT FORMATION: UNPACKING 
INVESTITURE RULES 67, 71–72 (Bjørn Rasch, Shane Martin & José Cheibub eds., 2015). Similarly, in Spain, a 
coalition must win an absolute majority in a first vote of investiture. However, if the government fails the first vote, 
the Spanish system also allows a Prime Minister to win by a relative majority in a second vote.  Id. at 71; Natalia 
Ajenjo, Why Minority Governments in Spain? How the Party System Undermines Investiture Rules, in MINORITY 
GOVERNMENTS IN SPAIN 153, 153 (Shane Martin, Bjorn Rasch & Jose Cheibub eds., 2015). 
53 Unlike Spain or Germany, a new government may take power in Belgium, Ireland, Israel or Italy if a relative 
majority of parliament votes in its favor. In all six of these countries, though the Head of State is constrained by 
Parliament, his appointment does not require a vote of investiture and the government remains in power until the 
opposition wins a vote of no confidence or the government resigns. Bergman, supra note 49. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
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 Because negative rules allow a government to take power without explicitly proving 
majority support in parliament, negative rules facilitate the creation of minority governments.56 
Between 1945 and 1987, for example, only fourteen percent of West Germany’s governments had 
minority status.57 These governments were transitional and only held power for a few months. In 
contrast, during the same time period, eighty-eight percent of Danish governments were 
minorities.58 Further, minority governments in countries with positive rules tend to hold a larger 
proportion of parliamentary seats than their counterparts in countries with negative rules, often 
falling just short of an absolute majority.59 
 Countries such as the Netherlands, Portugal, and Sweden have systems that contain a 
mixture of positive and negative rules. In the Netherlands, a vote of investiture is not strictly 
required but there is a strong norm suggesting the government should command majority support, 
not mere toleration, in the parliament.60 Portugal61 and Sweden62 combine the negative principle 
of tolerance with the positive requirement that parliament vote on the government’s policy plans 
or cabinet.63   
 Despite these findings, there is still some debate as to the importance of investiture rules 
in government formation. Prominent scholars of minority government formation have asserted 
that, “obviously, all [parliamentary] governments implicitly face an investiture vote whenever they 
                                                          
56 Id., at 59–62. 
57 Id. at 59. 
58 Id.  
59 Id. at 60–62. 
60 Id. at 57–58. 
61 “In Portugal a government appointed by the Head of State must present the parliament with its policy program 
within 10 days.” The program is accepted unless an absolute majority of parliament rejects the program, in which 
case the government must resign. Id. at 58. 
62 In Sweden, a coalition must positively prove that an absolute majority of the parliament will tolerate it before the 
coalition may assume power. The parliament’s Speaker suggests a candidate for Prime Minister and, so long as an 
absolute majority does not vote against the candidate and his cabinet, the candidate may assume power. Id.  
63 Id. 
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first expose themselves to the possibility of a parliamentary no confidence vote.”64 Thus, the 
argument contends, the defining feature of parliamentarism—the need for government to maintain 
legislative confidence—prevails regardless of whether the system requires a formal showing of 
parliamentary support.65 Evidence exploring the length of time required for governments to form66 
further bolsters scholars’ claims that investiture rules hold minimal significance in determining 
whether minority governments will form. The period between elections and government formation 
has lasted mere hours in some instances and months in others.67 If investiture rules play a key role 
in government formation, these scholars argue, they should add to the bargaining complexity and 
thus the time required to form a governing coalition. The existing literature has not definitively 
established whether this presumption is accurate. All else equal, one study of governments in 
Western Europe revealed that negative investiture rules often allow governments to form more 
quickly. However, another study containing multivariate analysis suggested that there was no 
meaningful difference in formation periods between systems with negative investiture rules and 
systems with positive investiture rules.68 
                                                          
64 Kaare Strøm, Ian Budge & Michael J. Laver, Constraints on Cabinet Formation in Parliamentary Democracies, 
38 AM. J. POL. SCI. 303, 311 (1994). 
65 Bjørn Erik Rasch, Shane Martin & José Antonio Cheibub, Investiture Rules and Government Formation, in 
PARLIAMENTS AND GOVERNMENT FORMATION: UNPACKING INVESTITURE RULES 1, 13 (Bjørn Rasch, Shane Martin 
& José Cheibub eds., 2015). Put differently, scholars have summarized the argument as follows: “Ultimately, a 
parliamentary government may be removed from office any time a majority of legislators decides that this is what 
should happen. As a result, any incoming government must be able to survive a vote of no confidence and, hence, 
enjoy the support of a legislative majority even if it never has to explicitly demonstrate this through an actual vote.” 
Matt Golder, Sona N. Golder & David A. Siegel, Modeling the Institutional Foundation of Parliamentary 
Government Formation, 74 J. POL. 427, 430 (2012).  
66 In the period between the election and the new government’s formation, countries are generally run by a caretaker 
government. In most countries, there is an informal understanding that caretaker governments avoid making major 
policy decisions. Ben Seyd, Coalition Government in Britain: Lessons from Overseas, NUFFIELD FOUND. 59–61 
(Jan. 2002), http://www.ucl.ac.uk/constitution-unit/publications/tabs/unit-publications/84.pdf. 
67 See Rasch, Martin & Cheibub, supra note 65, at 14. 
68 The study found that governments in systems defined by negative parliamentarism took an average of thirty-three 
days to form and governments in systems with positive parliamentarism took an average of forty-four days. 
Subsequent multivariate analysis, however, has reached different conclusions, suggesting that there was no 
meaningful difference in the length of time between elections and government formation in systems with positive 
versus negative rules. The findings did conclude that there was a minor difference in the established government’s 
tenure. Id. at 15. 
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B. The Role of Political Context  
As with all elections, political context surrounding elections that produce minority 
governments is crucial in determining how the elected officials will act once in office. Primarily, 
it can affect the plurality party’s decision to build coalitions or govern as a minority. Political 
context can also explain the prerequisite conditions that make minority governments more likely 
to emerge. 
1. Problematic Justifications 
 Few scholars have studied minority governments in depth. Rather, many have superficially 
addressed these governments in furtherance of an alternate point. Consequently, many of the 
prominently cited justifications for minority governments come from surface level interactions and 
cannot survive careful scrutiny. Such common but flawed explanations include political crisis or 
systemic instability, party system fractionalization, conflict and polarization, and other proximate 
conditions. Although many of these justifications seem facially logical, they are not empirically 
supported and often fall under a cursory investigation.  
  a.  Political Crisis and Instability 
 Many scholars cite minority governments as the byproduct of political crisis and instability; 
however, this association is rarely developed in great detail and is often 
unsubstantiated.69According to such crisis explanations, political instability is a precondition of 
minority government formation and thus there is a direct correlation between political instability 
and the manifestation of minority governments.70 These crisis explanations fail to identify the 
locus or severity of crisis that must exist to give rise to a minority government. A strong 
interpretation of this theory would equate minority governments with severe systemic instability, 
                                                          
69 STRØM, supra note 4, at 10. 
70 Id. 
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such as civil disorder, riots, or strikes. A weaker interpretation might merely link minority 
governments with cabinet instability.71  
 The crisis explanation further fails to account for minority governments’ presence, and 
indeed prevalence, absent crisis conditions in highly stable and politically tranquil democracies.72 
In fact, minority governments are most often present in functioning Western democracies, such as 
Finland, Italy, the Netherlands, and Spain.73 Indeed, the presence of a successful minority 
government may actually reflect underlying political and social stability, as intra-party cooperation 
and inter-party loyalty in the face of a divided constituency is crucial to such governments’ 
operation. When fifteen polities were ranked according to the relative incidence of minority 
governance, Norway, Sweden, and Canada topped the list, with Portugal, the United Kingdom, 
and Israel filling the bottom spots.74 There is hardly any evidence suggesting that this ranking can 
be linked to systemic government instability.  
 Finally, the most persistent explanation seeks to link minority governments to cabinet 
instability, though this hypothesis is also empirically unsupported.75 With the exception of 
Denmark, fifteen countries sampled naturally separate into two, equally sizeable groups: those 
with low cabinet stability76 and those with high cabinet stability.77 The comparison further revealed 
that minority governments constitute 26.8% of all governments in the low stability group and 
                                                          
71 Id. at 11. 
72 Id. at 62–63. 
73 Id. at 62–63, 246–69. 
74 Id. at 63. 
75 Id.  
76 These countries include Belgium, Finland, France’s Fourth Republic, Israel, Italy, and Portugal. Id. 
77 These countries include Canada, Iceland, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, and the United 
Kingdom. See id. at 63, 270. 
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37.2% of governments in the high stability group.78 When only minority situations79 are 
considered, minority governments accounted for 28.1% of governments in the low stability 
countries and 54.8% of governments in the high stability group.80 Therefore, the empirical 
evidence rejects the common hypothesis that minority governments are associated with cabinet 
instability, instead suggesting that minority governments are actually more closely linked, albeit 
loosely, with high cabinet stability. 
  b.  Party System Fractionalization 
 Scholars also commonly associate minority governments with political fragmentation and 
party system fractionalization.81 This argument asserts that the more fractionalized a parliamentary 
system is the more difficult it will be for the public to agree on a majority party in an election or 
for the elected parties to form a majority coalition, thus increasing the likelihood of a minority 
government.82 
 When investigated, this hypothesis also fails. The fractionalization theory has been tested 
against available data in Douglas Rae’s index of fractionalization for legislative seats,83 which 
revealed that average fractionalization scores for minority governments’ legislatures are lower than 
the average fractionalization scores present in majority coalitions.84 Although the difference 
                                                          
78 Id. at 63. 
79 Here, the term “minority situations” refers generally to instances where elections produced no single majority 
party, thus forcing the larger parties to either form majority coalitions or govern as minorities. Thus, this term 
focuses on the electoral results rather than the resulting government type.  
80  STRØM, supra note 4, at 63.  
81 Fractionalization measures the extent to which the legislature is composed of multiple small parties, rather than a 
few large parties. Id. at 64. 
82 Id.  
83 Douglas Rae is a political scientist and professor at Yale University. His index measures “the probability that two 
randomly selected legislators would belong to different parties.” Thus, Rae’s fractionalization variables range from 
zero, where only one party is represented, to one, where there is a perfectly atomized legislature. The score is always 
higher than 0.5 when there is no single majority party present. Id. 
84 Id. at 64–65, tbl.3.3. 
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between the average fractionalization scores is not dramatic,85 it nevertheless cuts against the 
prevailing hypothesis that fractionalization encourages minority governments. 
  c.  Conflict and Polarization 
 Political conflict and polarization is also commonly cited in conjunction with other factors, 
particularly conditions of fractionalization and instability, to justify the existence of minority 
governments. The definition of polarization in such studies, however, is often ambiguous and 
inconsistent.86 Some scholars have described polarization as the ideological expanse contained 
within the party system while others have used the term to signify “bipolar distributions of the 
electorate on various conflict dimensions, the cumulations of such cleavages, or the resultant social 
tensions and hostilities.”87 The unifying feature of each definition is that, unlike fractionalization, 
which stresses the numerical propensities of party systems, these accounts emphasize the 
ideological character of its members and their interaction.88 Reasoning that cleavage, conflict, 
extremism, and polarization negatively affect parties’ willingness to negotiate, proponents of this 
theory argue that polarization becomes a primary cause of minority government formation.89  
 Measuring polarization as the proportion of legislative seats held by extremist parties,90 
studies show that polarization relates to government type in essentially the same way as 
fractionalization.91 Majority party governments tend to form in less polarized systems, and 
                                                          
85 The fractionalization score for majority coalitions is 0.754. Formal minority governments have a fractionalization 
score of 0.723. Id. at 65.  
86 Id. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. at 14. 
89 Id. at 14–15. 
90 Extremist parties in this instance are defined as encompassing any of the following characteristics: (1) a well-
developed nondemocratic ideology; (2) a proposal to break up or fundamentally alter state boundaries; or (3) a 
diffuse protest, alienation, and distrust of the existing political system. Extremist parties were chosen as a marker of 
polarization in the relevant study because they exemplify a general unwillingness to bargain for cabinet 
participation. Id. at 65. 
91 Id. at 66. 
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nonpartisan governments form in the most polarized and fractionalized environments.92 On 
average, minority governments do not tend to appear in more polarized environments than those 
that produce majority coalitions.93 Rather, substantive minority governments are associated with 
noticeably lower levels of polarization than are majority coalitions.94 
  d.  Proximate Conditions 
 The final problematic explanation for the formation of minority governments is the 
conventional assumption that minority governments form only when all other options have been 
exhausted or no other alternatives exist. Under this reasoning, minority governments represent 
failed interparty relationships.95 Such explanations are commonly found in deductive coalition 
theories, which associate minority governments with constraints, limited choice, failure to 
negotiate, and lower-order preferences.96 If this hypothesis is true, minority governments should 
be associated with particularly long cabinet crises and numerous formation attempts. Kaare Strøm, 
a political science professor at the University of California and a leading authority on minority 
government operation, tested this hypothesis and found that, on average, substantive minority 
governments and majority coalitions have a very similar number of formation attempts: 2.00 
versus 2.01, respectively.97 Strøm further found that the average crisis preceding the formation of 
a majority government—including majority coalitions—lasted approximately 26.2 days, whereas 
the crisis preceding the formation of a minority government lasted only 16.1 days, ending 
approximately 40 percent earlier than crises associated with majority regimes.98 
                                                          
92 Majority governments and nonpartisan governments have an average polarization value of 0.016 and 0.213, 
respectively. Id. at 65, tbl.3.3.  
93 Id. at 65. 
94 Minority substantive governments have an average polarization value of 0.152. Id. at 65, tbl.3.3.  
95 Id. at 15. 
96 Id.  
97 Id. at 67, tbl.3.4. 
98 Id. at 67. 
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 Though counterintuitive, this difference may partially be explained by the number of 
parties involved in the government’s formation. The study revealed that single-party majority 
governments formed in only 8.4 days, while majority coalitions took approximately 31.3 days.99 
Similarly, substantive minority governments formed in 13.5 days, whereas formal minority 
governments formed in 36.7 days.100 Because substantive minority governments tend to be single-
party minorities with fewer formal inter-party agreements, fewer parties are likely to be involved 
in the negotiations leading up to the government’s formation.101 Thus, Strøm’s study generally 
showed that when multiple parties are involved in the government’s formation the duration of the 
pre-formation crisis increases.102 
2. Alternative Justification of Rational Choice 
 Minority government formation may be better explained by rational choice theory. A 
parliamentary majority is not a strict prerequisite for government functionality, and political parties 
are thus primarily concerned with both political office and political influence.103 To the extent that 
effectuating policy initiatives motivates party behavior, government participation is a helpful, but 
not necessary, condition.104 Political parties realize the importance of long term goals and are 
concerned about potential effects on future elections, particularly competitive elections.105 All of 
these factors combined help to explain why governing and opposition parties may opt not to form 
a majority coalition, instead ruling as a minority. 
                                                          
99 Id. at 67, tbl.3.4. 
100 Id.  
101 Id. at 68. 
102 Notably, the study revealed a dichotomy, not a direct correlation between the number of parties involved and the 
length of the pre-formation period. Though pre-formation crises associated with single-party governments are often 
much shorter than multi-party governments, there is no empirical evidence suggesting that the crisis’s duration 
further increases when more than two parties become involved. Id. 
103 See id. at 38.  
104 Id.  
105 Id.  
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 Political victory is crucial to analyses of political competition and is often defined as a 
party’s ability to effectuate its positions through legislative acts.106 This success is often thought 
to require an absolute majority in the legislature; however, there are several reasons to question 
this assumption. Legislative decisions often require qualified majorities,107 simple majorities, or 
simple pluralities.108 Systems requiring mere pluralities lend themselves particularly well to 
minority governments and become increasingly important when abstentions or divided opposition 
can benefit the governments.109 
 Additionally, when defining political parties merely as organizations that seek power in 
government, we should expect parties to prioritize votes or power. Though electoral success is a 
defining factor, party goals beyond mere government authority complicate this minimalistic 
definition.110 For example, in addition to constituents, parties need activists and members, many 
of whom are motivated by policy concerns, not government control.111 In competitive political 
systems, party officials, often selected based on their history of loyalty to the party, must be 
responsive to their followers’ concerns and thus often share the same long-term goals.112  
 If policy advancement replaces government office as a party’s primary motivator, holding 
political office becomes less important. This conclusion may seem counter-intuitive because the 
governing party dominates the government’s focuses and objectives. However, closer examination 
shows that opposition parties, despite their minority status, can still further their policy 
                                                          
106 See id. at 39. 
107 An example is the common two-thirds requirement in many countries’ constitutions. Id.  
108 Id.  
109 Id.  
110 Id. 
111 Id. at 39–40. 
112 Policy objectives are least likely to matter if parties are internally extremely hierarchical and undemocratic, if 
party competition is low, or if political corruption is rampant. The systems likely to produce minority governments, 
however, rarely reflect such conditions. Id. at 40. 
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objectives.113 First, it is possible that the governing party’s views may align with an opposition 
party’s views on certain issues.114 If this condition is met and the party’s constituents are results 
focused, the party will be rewarded even if it is not directly responsible for the policy’s 
advancement. Therefore, the opposition party does not need a majority of seats but can simply sit 
back and allow the governing party to progress the platform.  
 Second, even if the opposition party and governing party disagree on policy, the opposition 
party may still be able to exert political influence.115 In some political systems, many important 
policy decisions happen outside of the party-parliament relationship116 and opposition parties may 
use public criticism and other negotiation methods to assert their influence.117 Therefore, policy 
influence can more precisely be measured by degree, with the relative policy influence varying 
between the parties and polities.118 Strøm describes this relationship as a policy influence 
differential in which “the higher the policy influence differential, the greater the power of the 
government vis-à-vis the opposition. The smaller the differential, the less of an advantage it is to 
be in office.”119 Generally, Strøm concludes, the lower the differential, the smaller the incentives 
for policy-motivated parties to hold office and the more likely that opportunities to expand the 
governing coalition will be ignored.120 
                                                          
113 Id. at 41. 
114 Id.  
115 Id. 
116 For example, Strøm explains, decisions may be made “in corporatist networks of labor unions, employers’ 
associations, and bureaucrats.” Id. at 41. 
117 Studies of Italy, Norway, and France’s Fourth Republic, among others, have demonstrated that opposition parties 
may assert significant political influence. Id. at 42. 
118 Id.  
119 Strøm further notes that the influence differential refers to potential influence not actual power exercised. Further, 
the policy differential is low in polities with strong, deliberative legislatures and is likely to reflect a strong 
opposition rather than a weak government. The differential will always be positive because a negative differential 
would suggest the unlikely situation in which the opposition party is more powerful than the governing party. 
Though this is, admittedly, an overly-simplistic explanation as some political parties are capable of exerting greater 
influence than others, this differential is a helpful illustrative structure. Id. at 42–44.  
120 Id. at 44.  
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 Moreover, political parties adopt a temporal perspective oriented toward effectuating future 
success for their party. Therefore, particularly in competitive elections, political parties carefully 
consider how their stances will influence their chances in future elections and are discouraged from 
forming coalitions that could secure a government majority if they believe their future interests 
would be better served by remaining separate.121 Additionally, when considering future impacts, 
incumbency may actually prove to be an electoral disadvantage.122 Incumbent parties have less 
opportunity to choose their campaign issues and strategies and are more likely to have their 
reliability and responsibility tested.123 Therefore, governing parties can more easily lose the 
confidence of their constituency, a difference that several empirical studies have shown to reduce 
party votes in subsequent elections.124 Ceteris paribus, rational actors prefer individual, 
instantaneous success and thus opposition parties will be unlikely to formally join the governing 
party if they predict that a subsequent election will be competitive, in which case the consequences 
associated with incumbency are especially relevant.125  
 Finally, competitive elections tend to make it difficult for a single party to secure a 
meaningful majority and therefore encourage inclusive, moderate party platforms.126 The link 
between competitive elections and minority governments is evident in Scandinavian countries.127 
Denmark, for instance, has only experienced one single-party majority government, which held 
power at the beginning of the twentieth century.128 Rather, minority governments tend to be the 
                                                          
121 See id. at 44–45.  
122 Id. at 45.  
123 Id.  
124 Id. at 45–46. 
125 Id. at 46. 
126 See Walter M. Frank, Making Our Congressional Elections More Competitive: A Proposal for a Limited Number 
of Statewide At-Large Elections in Our More Populous States, 39 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1425, 1426–27 (2006). 
127 For a full explanation of the role competitive elections play in Scandinavian politics, see Kaare Strøm, Deferred 
Gratification and Minority Governments in Scandinavia, 11 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 583, 596–99 (1986). 
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rule, rather than the exception.129 In Denmark, electoral competition has made it more difficult for 
government parties to forge legislative coalitions, instead forcing them to rely on “ad hoc alliances 
with whichever party is closest to its stance on the issue in question.”130 This competitive 
atmosphere discourages formal and permanent coalition building and, thus, larger parties are more 
likely to govern as substantive minorities. Ireland’s Fianna Fáil party also governs in a competitive 
environment, and this competition with other parties, coupled with the sheer size of their support, 
makes the Fianna Fáil unwilling to contemplate a formal coalition or any other form of cooperation 
that may secure the additional seats needed to form a majority.131  
II.  MINORITY GOVERNMENTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 
 The various types of constitutional structures underlying a parliamentary system may affect 
the recurrence of minority governments. Of particular importance is the country’s electoral system, 
where first-past-the-post (“FPTP”) systems are more likely to reduce the number of active political 
parties, particularly at the national level, and are therefore less likely to produce a diverse 
parliament hosting a wide variety of political parties. Proportional representation systems, 
however, are more likely to reward small parties with legislative seats and thus tend to produce 
parliaments that contain a larger number of small and independent parties. Thus, proportional 
representation systems are more likely to produce minority governments than are FPTP systems.132  
 A country’s executive structure is also important; this structure, however, is less relevant 
to minority government development and is thought to play a more substantial role in determining 
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130 Id. at 128. 
131 Valentine Herman & John Pope, Minority Governments in Western Democracies, 3 BRITISH J. POL. SCI. 191, 
195–96 (1973). 
132 See Electoral System Design: The New International IDEA Handbook, INT’L INST. DEMOCRACY & ELECTORAL 
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a government’s stability once a minority government takes hold. Although statistically unfounded, 
some fear that divided minority governments in semi-presidential systems may pose a particular 
risk to the checks and balances associated with democracy and create an unstable government.133 
Ultimately, when tested, this negative association has not materialized.134 
A.  Minority Governments and Electoral Systems 
 Minority and coalition governments are inexorably linked to their country’s electoral 
system. FPTP systems are winner take all systems in which a candidate or party needs to secure a 
majority of votes cast in an election.135 Duverger’s hypothesis asserts that FPTP and single-
member simple plurality systems force voters and politicians to unite around a relatively moderate 
position to have a viable chance of winning a majority of votes in any election. This consolidation 
either completely eliminates smaller third parties or incorporates them into a dominant party, 
thereby creating a bipolar two-party system.136 In contrast, proportional representation (“PR”) 
systems assign legislative seats to political parties based on the percentage of the popular vote each 
party received in the election.137 Although many PR systems require parties to meet or surpass a 
designated minimum percentage of votes before a party will be awarded a legislative seat, the 
threshold is generally low. Thus, PR systems reward smaller parties and encourage a large number 
of parties with narrowly-tailored political platforms.138 
 Minority governments may arise under FPTP electoral systems; however, because FPTP 
systems encourage fewer parties, minority governments are less likely to emerge and survive. 
                                                          
133 Elgie & Schleiter, supra note 45, at 47.   
134 ROBERT ELGIE, SEMI-PRESIDENTIALISM: SUB-TYPES AND DEMOCRATIC PERFORMANCE 180–82 (2011). 
135 In some FPTP systems, a party or candidate need only secure a plurality of votes to prevail. Albert, supra note 3, 
at 565. 
136 E. Sridharan, Why Are Multi-Party Minority Governments Viable in India? Theory and Comparison, 50 
COMMONWEALTH & COMP. POL. 314, 326–27 (2012). 
137 Albert, supra note 3, at 565. 
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Canadian Parliamentarism exemplifies this phenomenon. The 2004 federal elections produced a 
minority government for the first time since 1979 with parliamentary seats split between a total of 
five parties.139 The governing Liberal Party earned 37% percent of the popular vote and 135 of the 
308 legislative seats,140 and the second-place Conservative Party earned 30% of the popular vote 
and 99 parliamentary seats.141 The established minority government, headed by Prime Minister 
Paul Martin, was plagued by political instability and lasted only eighteen months before falling to 
a vote of no confidence in the House of Commons.142 Other Canadian minority governments have 
similarly proven unstable. The minority government from 1972 to 1974, for instance, maintained 
a constant state of crisis control, fearful that its unsteady support system would collapse.143 The 
minority governments that served from 1962 to 1963 and 1979 to 1980 were similarly unsteady 
and ineffective, the former even attracting the attention of prominent American news sources 
which warned of the economic risks associated with Canadian minority governments.144  
 Nevertheless, not all minority governments in FPTP systems are destined for failure. 
Canada can also be used to exemplify this conclusion. Prime Minister Pearson’s minority 
governments in the 1960s, for instance, were highly productive. Despite their minority status, these 
governments passed the Canadian Pension Plan and the Canada Student Loan program, 
modernized the country’s immigration policy, created a new Canadian national flag, renewed 
national bilingualism, and established national health care.145 Accordingly, minority governments 
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in FPTP systems may be successful and stable, but only if the governing party is willing to 
compromise in the larger interest of political stability.  
Minority or coalition governments are far more likely in PR systems where small parties 
are more prevalent in the larger legislative body.146 In some cases, the costs of building and 
sustaining a working coalition, particularly a minority coalition, may be so great as to compel the 
plurality party’s leader to abandon efforts at coalition-building and simply govern as a single party 
minority.147 When larger parties do choose to endure the costs associated with forming a 
coalition,148 there are additional inefficiencies associated with maintaining the relationships. As 
time progresses, coalition members discover fewer matters upon which they may agree or 
adequately compromise, destabilizing the coalition and weakening its members’ dependability.149 
The legislative inefficiency associated with maintaining a coalition government also exacts a 
significant cost on political ideology. The parties constituting a coalition must dilute their policies 
to successfully present a bill that garners support from the entire coalition, and even then the 
resultant bill may require further concessions before the broader legislative assembly will approve 
it.150  
 Accordingly, coalitions are less likely to survive than single-party governments, a 
difference that may be explained by several factors. First, because a governing coalition may 
contain Cabinet members from different political parties, the prominent officials within the 
                                                          
146 See generally Mary A. Inman, C.P.R. (Change Through Proportional Representation): Resuscitating a Federal 
Election System, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1991, 2003–07 (1993) (explaining that PR systems inhibit the entrenchment of 
the two major parties and facilitate the proliferation of third parties). 
147 Following the 2002 Swedish parliamentary elections, for instance, Prime Minister Persson opted to renounce 
attempts at coalition building because his prospective coalition partners had opposed Swedish membership in the 
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government may have different constituencies and different interests that cause them to advocate 
for conflicting positions.151 Second, ministers may take positions that undermine the stability of 
the coalition in the interest of demonstrating their autonomy.152 Third, prominent officials within 
the coalition must navigate what may be an uneasy alliance, largely held together by convenience 
and the desire for power.153 These and other factors combine to create a government that displays 
legislative inefficiency similar to those that critics attribute to presidential systems.154  
 Though these findings apply to all coalition governments, including majority coalitions, 
they apply more strongly to minority governments and minority coalitions, which heavily rely on 
external support. Further, because minority governments depend so heavily on outside parties, they 
are constantly forced to confront these problems both within their formed coalitions as well as with 
parties with which they are not formally fused. 
 Finally, certain types of PR systems are more likely to produce minority governments.155 
Although Mixed Member Proportional (“MMP”) electoral systems often produce minority 
governments,156 such governments are not as common in MMP systems as in other PR systems.157 
MMP systems are systems in which legislative seats are awarded to compensate for any 
disproportionality produced by results for district seats.158 Depending on the country, voters may 
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get one choice with the party totals derived from the totals for the individual district candidates or 
two separate choices.159 The imbalanced production of minority governments is counter intuitive, 
because  
MMP contains incentives for voters to split their ticket, that is to vote for a 
party with their list vote but support a candidate of a different party with 
their constituency vote as a signal to parties which coalition they prefer. 
Hence, it is rational for parties to form pre-election coalitions and, when 
successful in general elections, to govern together.160 
 
Perhaps for exactly this reason, minority governments in countries using MMP systems are more 
often minority coalitions than single party minorities.161  
 Single transferable vote (“STV”) systems are also likely to yield coalition minority 
governments. An STV system uses multi-member districts and allows voters to rank candidates by 
preference.162 “At the first count, the total number of first-preference votes for each candidate is 
ascertained” and any “candidate who has a number of first preferences greater than or equal to the 
[designated] quota is immediately elected.”163 In subsequent counts, the votes for candidates who 
have surpassed the quota are redistributed according to the voters’ second preferences.164 Though 
political scientists claim an STV system is one of the most attractive electoral systems, it is only 
practiced in a handful of countries, including Ireland.165 One study from 1990 to 2006 revealed 
that STV systems produced minority coalitions approximately 24% of the time, though no single-
party minority governments emerged during this time period.166  
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 Although such PR systems are more likely to produce minority governments than other 
types of governments, it is important to note that these systems more commonly produce majority 
governments than minority governments.167 The study mentioned supra showed that between 1990 
and 2006, countries using MMP systems produce single-party minorities only 2% of the time and 
minority coalitions only 20% of the time.168 STV systems produced minority coalitions 24% of 
the time and no single-party minority governments.169 In total, minority governments constituted 
less than 30% of all governments in PR systems in the studied time period.170 
B.  Minority Governments and Semi-Presidential Systems 
 Semi-presidential systems can produce a rare type of minority government, termed a 
divided minority government.171 A divided minority government occurs where “neither the 
president nor prime minister, nor any party or coalition, enjoys a substantive majority in the 
legislature” and has been labeled “semi-presidentialism’s most conflict-prone subtype.”172 Some 
scholars reason that divided minority governments are particularly dangerous when the parties 
reach a stalemate and the legislature and president cannot have support or influence on a party or 
party coalition.173 In such conditions, there is a threat that, in an effort to defeat the stalemate and 
advance his position, the president may attempt to govern without or against the legislature, 
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dissolve the sitting legislature in the hopes of securing a future majority, or even disband the 
legislature.174 
 Some scholars have associated divided minority governments with legislative paralysis and 
presidential dominance.175 Because the legislature is ineffective and immobile, they argue, these 
governments create a risk that the president may attempt to expand executive power to fill the 
void.176 This presidential expansion is “accompanied by a narrowing of the decision-making arena 
to a small, handpicked group of nonparty ministers.”177 Accordingly, divided minority 
governments may prove detrimental to the separation of powers and pose a greater risk of 
democratic breakdown than any other sub-type of semi-presidentialism.178 These governments are 
especially dangerous to young democracies that are vulnerable to executive overreach, particularly 
those that do not have a stabilized party system.179 
 When studied closely, however, these fears proved unfounded. Controlling for all other 
relevant factors, studies have not exposed the expected correlation between divided minority 
governments and democratic collapse.180 Rather, such studies discovered a positive relationship 
between the presence of divided minority governments and democratic performance.181 It appears 
that pre-existing constitutional and structural incentives to power share have effectively prevented 
presidents in divided minority governments from overstepping their bounds.182 In fact, divided 
minority governments are most prevalent in successful semi-presidential democracies.183 Despite 
                                                          
174 Id.  
175 ELGIE, supra note 134, at 13. 
176 Id. 
177 SKACH, supra note 172, at 124. 
178 Id. at 18. 
179 ELGIE, supra note 134, at 13. 
180 Id. at 179. 
181 Id. at 181–82.  
182 Elgie & Schleiter, supra note 45, at 58–59. 
183 ELGIE, supra note 134, at 182. 
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the severity of the predicted damage, no country with a semi-presidential system has ever collapsed 
during a divided minority government’s tenure.184 
 Because presidents do not govern in a vacuum, strong presidents are neither a necessary 
nor a sufficient condition for democratic instability in semi-presidential countries.185 Where 
divided minority governments have historically been associated with democratic decline, this 
instability is better attributed to the dual accountability in a president-parliamentary system.186 
This is particularly the case where a prime minister is appointed by the president despite 
parliamentary opposition, thereby causing a power struggle between the president and parliament 
with the prime minister caught in the middle.187 This conflict “may result in frequent cabinet 
reshuffles and government collapses.”188  
 Between 2000 and 2008, Taiwan had a divided minority government in which the president 
and cabinet battled against an opposing parliamentary coalition.189 The Legislative Yuan was 
controlled by the Pan-Blue camp and President Chen insisted on appointing a fellow member of 
the Democratic Progressive Party as premier.190 Although President Chen appointed a total of six 
prime ministers during this period without the legislature’s consent and thus “had his way in 
forming the government, he could not stop the parliament from retaliation in other 
battlegrounds.”191 The Pan-Blue sect in the Legislative Yuan resisted Chen’s policy initiatives, 
effectively boycotted, and, though politically unable to follow through, threatened to impeach, the 
                                                          
184 Elgie & Schleiter, supra note 45, at 55. 
185 Yu-Shan Wu & Jung-Hsiang Tsai, Taiwan: Democratic Consolidation under President-Parliamentarism, in 
SEMI-PRESIDENTIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 174, 186–87 (Robert Elgie, Sophia Moestrup & Yu-Shan Wu eds., 2011). 
186 Id. at 181–82, 186. 
187 Wu & Tsai, supra note 185, at 186. 
188 Id.  
189 Id. at 187.  
190 Taiwan’s president can appoint the premier without the Legislative Yuan’s approval. Id. at 187–88.  
191 Id. at 188. 
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president.192 Therefore, because the minority government’s president and parliament dominated 
different territories, the opposition-controlled parliament was able to effectively prevent President 
Chen from radically expanding his powers.193 This conflict was tense, but eventually subsided with 
Taiwan’s democracy firmly in place.194 
CONCLUSION 
 Minority governments are fairly common in parliamentary systems and have governed in 
multiple stable and successful democracies, as well as countries like Taiwan where preserving 
democracy can be more difficult.195 Minority governments can form in a variety of systems 
depending on a multitude of factors, though PR electoral systems are more likely to produce 
minority governments than FPTP systems. Scholars have expressed concerns about the impacts 
that minority governments can have on democracy, particularly in semi-presidential systems. 
Ultimately, empirical studies suggest that not only are these predictions unfounded, but the inverse 
is actually true and minority governments tend to enhance democratic function by forcing opposing 
parties to work together as the only means of advancing their policy initiatives. Therefore, although 
the concept of governance by a minority of the population’s representatives may seem dangerous 
to democracy, minority governments should not be feared and should be accepted as a normal 
result of a functioning democracy. 
  
                                                          
192 Id. 
193 Id. at 189. 
194 Id. at 189–90. 
195 See infra Appendix.  
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APPENDIX: MINORITY GOVERNMENTS IN RECENT HISTORY196 
I.  WESTERN EUROPE 
 
A. Spain197 
 
Government Party: Central Democratic Union 
Leader: Adolfo Suarez 
Tenure: July 1977–April 1979198 
 
Government Party: Central Democratic Union  
Leader: Adolfo Suarez 
Tenure: April 1979–January 1981199 
 
Government Party: Central Democratic Union 
Leader: Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo 
Tenure: February 1981–October 1982200 
 
Government Party: Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party 
Leader: Felipe Gonzalez 
Tenure: December 1989–July 1993 
 
Government Party: Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party 
Leader: Felipe Gonzalez 
Tenure: July 1993–May 1996 
 
Government Party: People’s Party 
Leader: José María Aznar 
Tenure: May 1996–April 2000 
 
Government Party: Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party 
Leader: José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero  
Tenure: April 2004–April 2008 
 
Government Party: Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party 
Leader: José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero  
Tenure: April 2008 – December 2011  
 
Government Party: People’s Party 
Leader: Mariano Rajoy 
                                                          
196 This section will only include federal minority governments and will thus exclude minority governments on the 
local level. For purposes of this section, the term “recent history” refers to the post-World War II period.  
197 Ajenjo, supra note 52, at 160. 
198 STRØM, supra note 4, at 267. 
199 Id.  
200 Id.  
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Tenure: October 2016 – Present201 
 
B. Portugal202 
 
Government Party: Socialist; Military; and Center Social Democratic 
Leader: Mário Soares 
Tenure: July 1976–December 1977 
 
Government Party: Social Democratic  
Leader: Aníbal Cavaco Silva 
Tenure: November 1985–April 1987 
 
Government Party: Socialist  
Leader: Antonio Guterres 
Tenure: October 1995–October 1999203 
 
Government Party: Socialist  
Leader: Antonio Guterres 
Tenure: October 1999–March 2002204 
 
Government Party: Socialist  
Leader: José Sócrates 
Tenure: September 2009–June 2011205 
 
Government Party: Social Democratic  
Leader: Pedro Passos Coelho 
Tenure: October 2015–November 2015206 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
201 Bonnie N. Field, Will the New Rajoy Minority Government in Spain Work?, LONDON SCH. ECON. & POL. SCI.: 
EUROPP (Nov. 16, 2016), http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2016/11/16/will-the-new-rajoy-minority-government-
in-spain-work/. 
202 STRØM, supra note 4, at 266. 
203 Francisco José Viega & Linda Gonçalves Viega, The Determinants of Vote Intentions in Portugal, 118 PUB. 
CHOICE 342, 348 tbl.2 (2004), 
https://repositorium.sdum.uminho.pt/bitstream/1822/1455/1/Public_Choice_March_2004.pdf. 
204 Id.  
205 Portugal, FREEDOM HOUSE, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2011/portugal (last visited Mar. 31, 
2018). 
206 See Angelique Chrisafis, Portugese MPs Force Minority Government to Quit over Austerity, GUARDIAN (Nov. 
10, 2015, 2:28 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/10/portuguese-mps-force-minority-government-
to-quit-over-austerity.  
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C. Germany207 
 
Government Party: Christian Democratic Union of Germany 
Leader: Konrad Adenauer 
Tenure: November 1962  
 
Government Party: Christian Democratic Union of Germany 
Leader: Ludwig Erhard 
Tenure: November 1965–December 1965 
 
Government Party: Social Democratic  
Leader: Helmut Schmidt 
Tenure: September 1982  
 
D. Belgium208 
 
Government Party: Wallon Socialist  
Leader: Paul-Henri Spaak 
Tenure: March 1946 
 
Government Party: Christian Social  
Leader: Gaston Eyskens 
Tenure: June 1958–November 1958 
 
Government Party: Flemish Christian People’s Party; Wallon Christian Socialist; Liberal; and 
Flemish Liberal  
Leader: Leonard Tindemans 
Tenure: April 1974–June 1974 
 
Government Party: Flemish Christian People’s Party; Wallon Christian Socialist; Liberal; and 
Flemish Liberal  
Leader: Leonard Tindemans 
Tenure: March 1977–April 1977 
 
E. Italy209 
 
Government Party: Christian Democratic  
Leader: Alcide De Gasperi 
Tenure: May 1947–December 1947  
 
                                                          
207 All three minority cabinets in Germany in the time period studied were transitory in the run-up to the formation 
of a new government within the term and none of them resulted from an investiture vote. Ganghof & Stecker, supra 
note 52, at 14, 16, 18. See Manfred G. Schmidt, Germany: The Grand Coalition State, in POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS IN 
EUROPE 55 (Josep M. Colomer ed., 2002).  
208 STRØM, supra note 4, at 246. 
209 Id. at 259–61. 
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Government Party: Christian Democratic  
Leader: Alcide De Gasperi 
Tenure: July 1953  
 
Government Party: Christian Democratic  
Leader: Giuseppe Pella 
Tenure: August 1953–January 1954 
 
Government Party: Christian Democratic  
Leader: Amintore Fanfani 
Tenure: January 1954 
 
Government Party: Christian Democratic  
Leader: Adone Zoli 
Tenure: May 1957–June 1958 
 
Government Party: Christian Democratic; and Social Democratic  
Leader: Amintore Fanfani 
Tenure: July 1958–January 1959 
 
Government Party: Christian Democratic  
Leader: Antonio Segni 
Tenure: February 1959–February 1960 
 
Government Party: Christian Democratic  
Leader: Fernando Tambroni 
Tenure: March 1960–July 1960 
 
Government Party: Christian Democratic  
Leader: Amintore Fanfani 
Tenure: July 1960–February 1962 
 
Government Party: Christian Democratic  
Leader: Giovanni Leone 
Tenure: June 1963–November 1963  
 
Government Party: Christian Democratic  
Leader: Giovanni Leone 
Tenure: June 1968–November 1968  
 
Government Party: Christian Democratic  
Leader: Mariano Rumor 
Tenure: August 1969–February 1970 
 
Government Party: Christian Democratic  
Leader: Giulio Andreotti  
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Tenure: February 1972 
 
Government Party: Christian Democratic; and People’s Party 
Leader: Aldo Moro 
Tenure: November 1974–January 1976 
 
Government Party: Christian Democratic  
Leader: Giulio Andreotti 
Tenure: July 1976–January 1978 
 
Government Party: Christian Democratic  
Leader: Giulio Andreotti 
Tenure: March 1978–January 1979 
 
Government Party: Christian Democratic; Social Democratic; and Republican  
Leader: Giulio Andreotti 
Tenure: March 1979 
 
Government Party: Christian Democratic; Social Democratic; and Liberal  
Leader: Francesco Cossiga 
Tenure: August 1979–March 1980 
 
Government Party: Christian Democratic  
Leader: Amnitore Fanfani 
Tenure: April 1987 
 
Government Party: Democratic Party of the Left; People’s Party; Italian Renewal; Greens; and 
Communist Refoundation 
Leader: Romano Prodi 
Tenure: May 1996–October 1998210 
  
F. Netherlands211 
 
Government Party: Anti-Revolutionary; and Catholic People’s Party 
Leader: Jelle Zijlstra 
Tenure: November 1966–February 1967 
 
Government Party: Anti-Revolutionary; Catholic People’s Party; Christian Historical Union; and 
Liberal  
Leader: Barend Biesheuvel 
                                                          
210 Federico Russo, Government Formation in Italy: The Challenge of Bicameral Investiture, in PARLIAMENTS AND 
GOVERNMENT FORMATION: UNPACKING INVESTITURE RULES 136, 144 (Bjørn Rasch, Shane Martin & José Cheibub 
eds., 2015); Francesco Marangoni & Michelangelo Vercesi, The Government and Its Hard Decisions: How Conflict 
is Managed Within the Coalition, in THE CHALLENGE OF COALITION: THE ITALIAN CASE 17, 20 (Nicoló Conti & 
Francesco Marangoni eds., 2014).  
211 STRØM, supra note 4, at 262. 
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Tenure: August 1972–November 1972 
 
Government Party: Christian Democratic Appeal; Democrats 66 
Leader: Dries van Agt 
Tenure: May 1982–September 1982 
 
Government Party: People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy; and Christian Democratic 
Appeal Coalition 
Leader: Mark Rutte 
Tenure: October 2010–November 2012212  
 
G. France (Fourth Republic)213 
 
Government Party: Socialist  
Leader: Léon Blum 
Tenure: December 1946–January 1947 
 
Government Party: Popular Republican Movement; Democratic and Socialist Union of the 
Resistance; and Radical Socialist  
Leader: Georges Bidault 
Tenure: February 1950–June 1950 
 
Government Party: Radical Socialist; Popular Republican Movement; Democratic and Socialist 
Union of the Resistance; and Conservative 
Leader: Henri Queuille 
Tenure: July 1950 
 
Government Party: Democratic and Socialist Union of the Resistance; Popular Republican 
Movement; Radical Socialist; Peasant; and Conservative 
Leader: René Pleven 
Tenure: August 1951–January 1952 
 
Government Party: Radical Socialist; Popular Republican Movement; Democratic and Socialist 
Union of the Resistance; Conservative; and Peasant 
Leader: Félix Faure 
Tenure: January 1952–February 1952 
 
Government Party: Conservatives; Democratic and Socialist Union of the Resistance; Radical 
Socialist; Peasant; and Popular Republican Movement 
                                                          
212 See Anne van der Shoot & Joost Akkermans, The Dutch Have Voted . . . So How Do They Put Together a 
Government?, BLOOMBERG POLITICS (Mar. 15, 2017, 8:30 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-
03-16/the-dutch-have-voted-so-how-do-they-put-together-a-government; Rudy B. Andeweg & Galen A. Irwin, 
Update 3: The First Dutch Minority Government?, PALGRAVE, https://he.palgrave.com/companion/Andeweg-And-
Irwin-Governance-And-Politics-Of-The-Netherlands-/updates/03-The-first-Dutch-minority-government/ (last visited 
Mar. 30, 2018).  
213 STRØM, supra note 4, at 253–54. 
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Leader: Antoine Pinay 
Tenure: March 1952–December 1952 
 
Government Party: Radical Socialist; Democratic and Socialist Union of the Resistance; Popular 
Republican Movement; Conservative; and Peasant 
Leader: René Mayer  
Tenure: January 1953–May 1953 
 
Government Party: Socialist; Popular Republican Movement; Democratic and Socialist Union of 
the Resistance; and Radical Socialist 
Leader: Christian Pineau 
Tenure: February 1955 
 
Government Party: Socialist; Radical Socialist; Democratic and Socialist Union of the 
Resistance 
Leader: Guy Mollet 
Tenure: February 1956–May 1957 
 
Government Party: Radical Socialist; Socialist; Democratic and Socialist Union of the 
Resistance; and Left Republican 
Leader: Maurice Bourges-Maunoury 
Tenure: June 1957–September 1957 
 
Government Party: Conservatives; Left Republican; Democratic and Socialist Union of the 
Resistance/African Democrats; and Neo-Radical 
Leader: Antoine Pinay 
Tenure: October 1957 
 
H. United Kingdom214 
 
Government Party: Labour  
Leader: Harold Wilson 
Tenure: March 1974–October 1974 
 
Government Party: Labour  
Leader: James Callaghan 
Tenure: November 1976–May 1979 
 
Government Party: Conservative  
Leader: John Major 
Tenure: December 1996–May 1997215 
 
                                                          
214 Id. at 269.  
215 In 1996 and 1997 John Major’s government became a minority government because of defections and losses at 
by-elections. Stone, supra note 9.  
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Government Party: Conservative; and Democratic Unionist  
Leader: Theresa May 
Tenure: June 2017–Present 216 
 
1.  Scotland 
 
Government Party: Scottish National  
Leader: Alex Salmond 
Tenure: May 2007–May 2011217 
 
Government Party: Scottish National  
Leader: Nicola Sturgeon 
Tenure: May 2016–Present218  
 
2.  Wales 
 
Government Party: Welsh Labour  
Leader: Alun Michael 
Tenure: May 1999–October 2000219 
 
Government Party: Welsh Labour  
Leader: Rhodri Morgan 
Tenure: May 2007–July 2007220 
 
I. Ireland221 
 
Government Party: Fine Gael; Labour; National Labout; Clann na Talmhan; and Clann na 
Poblachta  
Leader: John A. Costello 
Tenure: February 1948–June 1951 
 
Government Party: Fianna Fáil 
Leader: Éamon de Valera  
Tenure: June 1951–May 1954 
                                                          
216 See Britain’s May Forms Minority Government with Backing of Northern Irish Party, NPR (June 26, 2017, 9:35 
AM), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/06/26/534387779/britains-may-forms-minority-government-
with-backing-of-northern-irish-party. 
217 See Christopher K. Connolly, Independence in Europe: Secession, Sovereignty, and the European Union, 24 
DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 51, 62 (2013). 
218 SNP Celebrate Victory in Scotland, BBC NEWS, http://www.bbc.com/news/election/2016/scotland/results (last 
visited Mar. 30, 2018). 
219 Rosanne Palmer, Stephen Thornton & Mark Crowley, Government Formation in the National Assembly for 
Wales, in NO OVERALL CONTROL?: THE IMPACT OF A ‘HUNG PARLIAMENT’ ON BRITISH POLITICS 63 (Alex Brazier & 
Susanna Kalitowski eds., 2008). 
220 Id. at 81–82. 
221 STRØM, supra note 4, at 256. 
 
 41 
 
 
Government Party: Fianna Fáil 
Leader: Seán Lemass 
Tenure: October 1961–April 1965  
 
Government Party: Fine Gael; and Labour222 
Leader: Garret FitzGerald  
Tenure: June 1981–January 1982 
 
Government Party: Fianna Fáil 
Leader: Charles Haughey 
Tenure: March 1982–November 1982 
 
Government Party: Fine Gael, Labour  
Leader: Garret Fitzgerald 
Tenure: December 1986–January 1987  
 
Government Party: Fianna Fáil 
Leader: Charles Haughey 
Tenure: February 1987–June 1989 
 
Government Party: Fianna Fáil; and Progressive Democratic 
Leader: Bertie Ahern 
Tenure: June 1997–June 2002223  
 
Government Party: Fine Gael 
Leader: Enda Kenny 
Tenure: April 2016–Present224 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
222 Although the Fianna Fáil had a comparative majority in the Dáil, Fine Gael and the Labour Party, the second and 
third largest parties respectively, governed as a minority coalition.  1981 General Election, IRISH ELECTIONS, 
http://irelandelection.com/elections.php?detail=yes&tab=summary&elecid=10&electype=1 (last visited Apr. 6, 
2018).  
223 Lucinda Maer & Richard Kelly, Hung Parliaments, House of Commons Lib. Briefing Paper No. 04951, at 4 
(Oct. 9, 2017), researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/SN04951/SN04951.pdf. 
224 Henry McDonald, Ireland Set for Minority Government after Two Main Parties Reach Deal, GUARDIAN (Apr. 
29, 2016, 2:43 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/apr/29/ireland-fianna-fail-fine-gail-minority-
government-enda-kenny. 
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II.  EASTERN EUROPE 
 
A.  Hungary225 
 
Government Party: Hungarian Socialist 
Leader: Ferec Gyurcsány 
Tenure: April 2008–April 2009  
 
Government Party: Hungarian Socialist 
Leader: Gordon Bajnai 
Tenure: April 2009–May 2010 
 
B.  Poland226 
 
Government Party: Center  
Leader: Jan Olszewski 
Tenure: December 1991–June 1992227 
 
Government Party: Democratic Union 
Leader: Hanna Suchocka  
Tenure: July 1992–May 1993228 
 
Government Party: Solidarity Electoral Action 
Leader: Jerzy Buzek  
Tenure: June 2000–October 2001 
 
Government Party: Democratic Left Alliance; and Labor Union  
Leader: Leszek Miller 
Tenure: March 2003–May 2004 
 
Government Party: Democratic Left Alliance; Labor Union   
Leader: Marek Belka 
Tenure: May 2004–October 2005 
 
                                                          
225 PARTY PATRONAGE AND PARTY GOVERNMENT IN EUROPEAN DEMOCRACIES 165 (Petr Kopecký, Peter Mair & 
Maria Spirova eds., 2012). In response to growing prejudice and to protect minority rights, in 1993 the Hungarian 
Parliament initiated a constitutional change that recognized minorities’ group rights and created local minority 
government. Under this initiative, “individual minorities can organize local minority self-government . . . and also 
minority self-government at the national level.” Between 1993 and 1997 alone there have been 810 local minority 
governments throughout Hungary. Kinga Göncz & Sandor Geskó, Ethnic Minorities in Hungary: Democracy and 
Conflict Resolution, 552 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 28, 33 (1997). 
226 All data post-1992 available in Radoslaw Zubek, Investiture Rules and Minority Governments in Poland, in 
PARLIAMENTS AND GOVERNMENT FORMATION: UNPACKING INVESTITURE RULES 165, 165 (Bjørn Rasch, Shane 
Martin & José Cheibub eds., 2015). 
227 Krzysztof Jasiewicz, Dead Ends and New Beginnings, in POLAND’S TRANSFORMATION: A WORK IN PROGRESS 
89, 103 (Marek Jan Chodakiewicz, John Radziłowski & Driusz Tołczyk eds., 2009). 
228 Id. at 103–04. 
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Government Party: Law and Justice 
Leader: Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz 
Tenure: October 2005–May 2006 
 
Government Party: Law and Justice 
Leader: Jarosław Kaczyński 
Tenure: August 2007–November 2007 
 
C.  Romania229 
 
Government Party: Social Democratic  
Leader: Adrian Năstase 
Tenure: December 2000–June 2003 
 
Government Party: Social Democratic  
Leader: Adrian Năstase 
Tenure: June 2003–March 2004 
 
Government Party: Social Democratic  
Leader: Adrian Năstase 
Tenure: March–December 2004 
 
Government Party: Alliance of Liberals and Democrats 
Leader: Cǎlin Popescu-Tǎriceanu 
Tenure: December 2004–April 2007 
 
Government Party: Alliance of Liberals and Democrats 
Leader: Cǎlin Popescu-Tǎriceanu 
Tenure: April 2007–December 2008 
 
Government Party: National Liberal  
Leader: Emil Boc 
Tenure: December 2009–September 2010 
 
Government Party: National Liberal  
Leader: Emil Boc 
Tenure: September 2011–February 2012 
 
Government Party: National Liberal  
Leader: Mihai Rǎzvan Ungureanu 
Tenure: February 2012–May 2012 
 
Government Party: Social Liberal Union 
                                                          
229 Cristina Chiva, Strong Investiture Rules and Minority Governments in Romania, in PARLIAMENTS AND 
GOVERNMENT FORMATION: UNPACKING INVESTITURE RULES 197, 205 (BjørnRasch, Shane Martin & José Cheibub 
eds., 2015). 
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Leader: Victor Ponta 
Tenure: May 2012–December 2012 
 
D.  Czech Republic230 
 
Government Party: Civic Democratic; Civic Democratic Alliance; and Christian and Democratic 
Union Czechoslovak People’s Party 
Leader: Václav Klaus  
Tenure: July 1996–January 1998 
 
Government Party: Czech Social Democratic  
Leader: Miloš Zeman 
Tenure: August 1998–August 2002 
 
III.  NORDIC COUNTRIES 
 
A.  Denmark231 
 
Government Party: Liberal 
Leader: Knud Kristensen 
Tenure: November 1945–October 1947 
 
Government Party: Social Democratic 
Leader: Hans Hedtoft 
Tenure: November 1947–August 1950 
 
Government Party: Social Democratic 
Leader: Hans Hedtoft 
Tenure: September 1950–October 1950  
 
Government Party: Liberal; and Conservative 
Leader: Erik Eriksen 
Tenure: October 1950–April 1953 
 
Government Party: Liberal; and Conservative 
Leader: Erik Eriksen 
Tenure: April 1953–September 1953 
 
Government Party: Social Democratic 
Leader: Hans Hedtoft 
Tenure: Septemer 1953–January 1955 
                                                          
230 The minority governments that failed to obtain parliamentary confirmation are omitted from this section. Those 
governments were headed by Mirek Topolánek in October 2006 and Jiří Rusnok in August 2013. Robert Zbiral, 
Changing Investiture Rules in the Czech Republic, in PARLIAMENTS AND GOVERNMENT FORMATION: UNPACKING 
INVESTITURE RULES 182, 191 (Bjørn Rasch, Shane Martin & José Cheibub eds., 2015). 
231 STRØM, supra note 4, at 249–50; Seyd, supra note 66, at 18–19.  
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Government Party: Social Democratic 
Leader: Hans Christian Hansen  
Tenure: February 1955–May 1957 
 
Government Party: Social Democratic; and Radical 
Leader: Viggo Kampmann 
Tenure: November 1960–September 1962 
 
Government Party: Social Democratic; and Radical 
Leader: Jens Otto Krag 
Tenure: September 1962–September 1964 
 
Government Party: Social Democratic 
Leader: Jens Otto Krag 
Tenure: September 1964–November 1966 
 
Government Party: Social Democratic 
Leader: Jens Otto Krag 
Tenure: November 1966–January 1968 
 
Government Party: Social Democratic 
Leader: Jens Otto Krag 
Tenure: October 1971–October 1972 
 
Government Party: Social Democratic 
Leader: Anker Jørgensen 
Tenure: October 1972–December 1973 
 
Government Party: Liberal 
Leader: Poul Hartling 
Tenure: December 1973–January 1975 
 
Government Party: Social Democratic 
Leader: Anker Jørgensen 
Tenure: February 1975–February 1977  
 
Government Party: Social Democratic 
Leader: Anker Jørgensen 
Tenure: February 1977–August 1978 
 
Government Party: Social Democratic; and Liberal 
Leader: Anker Jørgensen 
Tenure: August 1978–September 1979  
 
Government Party: Social Democratic 
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Leader: Anker Jørgensen 
Tenure: October 1979–November 1981  
  
Government Party: Social Democratic 
Leader: Anker Jørgensen 
Tenure: December 1981–September 1982 
 
Government Party: Conservatives People’s Party; Liberal; Centre Democratic; and Christian 
People’s Party  
Leader: Poul Schlüter 
Tenure: September 1982–January 1984 
 
Government Party: Conservatives People’s Party; Liberal; Centre Democratic; and Christian 
People’s Party  
Leader: Poul Schlüter 
Tenure: January 1984–September 1987  
 
Government Party: Conservatives People’s Party; Liberal; Centre Democratic; and Christian 
People’s Party 
Leader: Poul Schlüter 
Tenure: September 1987–May 1988  
 
Government Party: Conservative People’s Party; Liberal; and Danish Social Liberal 
Leader: Poul Schlüter 
Tenure: May 1988–December 1990 
 
Government Party: Conservative People’s Party; Liberal 
Leader: Poul Schlüter 
Tenure: December 1990–January 1993  
 
Government Party: Social Democratic; Centre Democratic; and Danish Social Liberal 
Leader: Poul Nyrup Rasmussen 
Tenure: September 1994–December 1996  
 
Government Party: Social Democratic; and Danish Social Liberal 
Leader: Poul Nyrup Rasmussen 
Tenure: December 1996–March 1998 
 
Government Party: Social Democratic; and Danish Social Liberal 
Leader: Poul Nyrup Rasmussen 
Tenure: March 1998–November 2001  
 
Government Party: Liberal; and Conservative People’s Party 
Leader: Anders Fogh Rasmussen; Lars Løkke Rasmussen 
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Tenure: November 2001–October 2011232 
 
Government Party: Social Democratic; Danish Social Liberal; and Socialist People’s Party 
Leader: Helle Thorning-Schmidt 
Tenure: October 2011–February 2014233 
 
Government Party: Social Democratic; and Danish Social Liberal 
Leader: Helle Thorning-Schmidt 
Tenure: February 2014–June 2015234 
 
Government Party: Liberal 
Leader: Lars Løkke Rasmussen 
Tenure: June 2015–November 2016235 
 
Government Party: Liberal; the Liberal Alliance; and Conservative 
Leader: Lars Løkke Rasmussen 
Tenure: November 2016–Present236 
 
B.  Sweden237 
 
Government Party: Social Democratic 
Leader: Tage Erlander  
Tenure: September 1948–September 1952 
 
Government Party: Social Democratic; and Farmer’s League 
Leader: Tage Erlander  
Tenure: September 1956–June 1958 
 
Government Party: Social Democratic 
Leader: Tage Erlander 
Tenure: June 1958–September 1960 
                                                          
232 Anders Fogh Rasmussen was reelected in 2005 and 2007. Gunnar Thesen, Making and Shaking Government? 2, 
8 (2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Aarhaus Universitet Institut for Statskundskab), 
http://ps.au.dk/fileadmin/Statskundskab/Billeder/Forskning/Forskningsprojekter/POLIS/Documents/Making_and_sh
aking_government.pdf. Lars Løkke Rasmussen replaced Anders Fogh Rasmussen after the latter was elected NATO 
Secretary General in April 2009. See Rasmussen, NATO REV. MAG., 
http://www.nato.int/docu/review/topics/en/Rasmussen.htm (last visited Mar. 31, 2018). 
233 Jeff Wallenfeldt, Helle Thorning-Schmidt, ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA, 
https://www.britannica.com/biography/Helle-Thorning-Schmidt (last updated June 19, 2015).  
234 Id.  
235 Denmark PM Strikes Deal to Form New Government, DW.COM (Nov. 27, 2016), 
http://www.dw.com/en/denmark-pm-strikes-deal-to-form-new-government/a-36543082. 
236 Annabella PultzNielsen, Danish PM Names New Coalition Ministers, Reducing Risk of Snap Poll, REUTERS 
(Nov. 28, 2016, 4:12 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-denmark-government/danish-pm-names-new-
coalition-ministers-reducing-risk-of-snap-poll-idUSKBN13N0NW. 
237 STRØM, supra note 4, at 268; Davide Denti, Swedish Minority Governments: From Origins Toward an End? 4–5 
(Mar. 2007) (unpublished paper) (on file with Södertörns Högskola University College), 
http://www.denti.it/papers/Davide%20Denti%20-%20Swedish%20Minority%20Governments.pdf. 
 48 
 
 
Government Party: Social Democratic 
Leader: Tage Erlander 
Tenure: September 1960–September 1964 
 
Government Party: Social Democratic 
Leader: Tage Erlander 
Tenure: September 1964–September 1968 
 
Government Party: Social Democratic 
Leader: Olof Palme 
Tenure: September 1970–September 1973 
 
Government Party: Social Democratic 
Leader: Olof Palme 
Tenure: September 1973–September 1976 
 
Government Party: Centre  
Leader: Thorbjörn Fälldin 
Tenure: October 1978–October 1979 
 
Government Party: Center; and People’s Party 
Leader: Thorbjörn Fälldin 
Tenure: May 1981–September 1982  
 
Government Party: Social Democratic 
Leader: Olof Palme 
Tenure: October 1982–September 1985  
 
Government Party: Social Democratic 
Leader: Olof Palme 
Tenure: October 1985–February 1986 
 
Government Party: Social Democratic 
Leader: Ingvar Carlsson  
Tenure: March 1986–September 1988 
 
Government Party: Social Democratic 
Leader: Ingvar Carlsson  
Tenure: March 1988–September 1988 
 
Government Party: Social Democratic 
Leader: Ingvar Carlsson  
Tenure: September 1988–October 1991  
 
Government Party: Moderate; Liberal; Christian Democratic; and Center  
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Leader: Carl Bildt 
Tenure: September 1991–October 1994 
 
Government Party: Social Democratic 
Leader: Ingvar Carlsson  
Tenure: September 1994–March 1996  
 
Government Party: Social Democratic 
Leader: Göran Persson 
Tenure: March 1996–September 1998  
 
Government Party: Social Democratic 
Leader: Göran Persson 
Tenure: September 1998–September 2002  
 
Government Party: Social Democratic 
Leader: Göran Persson 
Tenure: September 2002–October 2006 
 
Government Party: Moderate; Liberal; Christian Democratic; and Center  
Leader: Fredrik Reinfeldt 
Tenure: October 2010–September 2014238 
 
Government Party: Social Democratic; and Green  
Leader: Stefan Löfven 
Tenure: September 2014–Present239  
 
C.  Norway240 
 
Government Party: Labor  
Leader: Einar Gerhardsen 
Tenure: September 1961–August 1963 
 
Government Party: Conservative; Liberal; Christian People’s Party; and Center  
Leader: John Lyng  
Tenure: August 1963–September 1963 
 
Government Party: Labor  
Leader: Einar Gerhardsen 
Tenure: September 1963–October 1965 
                                                          
238 Sweden—Politics, GLOBALSECURITY.ORG (Mar. 1, 2018, 6:30 PM), 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/europe/se-politics.htm. 
239 The Swedish System of Government, SWEDEN.SE, https://sweden.se/society/the-swedish-system-of-government/ 
(last updated Jan. 18, 2018). 
240 STRØM, supra note 4, at 264–65; HILMAR ROMMETVEDT, THE RISE OF THE NORWEGIAN PARLIAMENT 26–28 
(2004). 
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Government Party: Labor  
Leader: Trygve Brattel 
Tenure: March 1971–October 1972 
 
Government Party: Christian Democratic; Centre; and Liberal 
Leader: Lars Korvald  
Tenure: October 1972–October 1973 
 
Government Party: Labor  
Leader: Trygve Bratteli 
Tenure: October 1973–January 1976 
 
Government Party: Labor  
Leader: Odvar Nordli 
Tenure: January 1976–September 1977 
 
Government Party: Labor  
Leader: Odvar Nordli 
Tenure: September 1977–January 1981 
 
Government Party: Labor  
Leader: Gro Harlem Brundtland 
Tenure: February 1981–October 1981 
 
Government Party: Conservative 
Leader: Kåre Willoch 
Tenure: October 1981–June 1983 
 
Government Party: Conservative  
Leader: Kåre Willoch 
Tenure: September 1985–May 1986  
 
Government Party: Labor  
Leader: Gro Harlem Brundtland 
Tenure: May 1986–October 1989 
 
Government Party: Conservative; Christian Democratic; and Centre 
Leader: Jan Syse 
Tenure: September 1989–November 1990 
 
Government Party: Labor  
Leader: Gro Harlem Brundtland 
Tenure: November 1990–October 1996 
 
Government Party: Labor  
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Leader: Thorbjørn Jagland 
Tenure: October 1996–October 1997 
 
Government Party: Christian Democratic; Conservative; Centre; and Liberal 
Leader: Kjell Magne Bondevik 
Tenure: October 1997–March 2000 
 
Government Party: Labor  
Leader: Jens Stoltenberg 
Tenure: March 2000–October 2001241 
 
Government Party: Conservative; Christian Democratic; and Liberal 
Leader: Kjell Magne Bondevik 
Tenure: October 2001–September 2005242 
 
Government Party: Conservative; and Progressive  
Leader: Erna Solberg 
Tenure: September 2013–Present243 
 
D.  Finland244 
 
Government Party: Finnish People’s Democratic Union 
Leader: Karl-August Fagerholm 
Tenure: July 1948–March 1950 
 
Government Party: Center; Swedish People’s Party; and Liberal  
Leader: Urho Kekkonen  
Tenure: March 1950–January 1951 
 
Government Party: Center; and Swedish People’s Party 
Leader: Urho Kekkonen   
Tenure: July–November 1953 
 
Government Party: Center; Swedish People’s Party; and Liberal 
Leader: Vieno Johannes Sukselainen 
Tenure: May–July 1957 
 
Government Party: Center; and Liberal 
Leader: Vieno Johannes Sukselainen 
Tenure: July–September 1957 
                                                          
241 Jens Stoltenberg, REGJERINGEN.NO, https://www.regjeringen.no/en/the-government/previous-
governments/ministries-and-offices/offices/prime-minister-since-1814/jens-stoltenberg/id549862/ (last updated June 
25, 2014). 
242 Norwegian PM Announces Resignation, GUARDIAN (Sept. 13, 2005, 10:22 AM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2005/sep/13/1. 
243 Norway Profile—Leaders, BBC NEWS (Oct. 17, 2013), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-17745324. 
244 STRØM, supra note 4, at 251–52. 
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Government Party: Center; Liberal; and Finnish Social Democratic  
Leader: Vieno Johannes Sukselainen 
Tenure: September–October 1957  
 
Government Party: Center/The Agrarian Union 
Leader: Vieno Johannes Sukselainen 
Tenure: January 1959–June 1961 
 
Government Party: Center/The Agrarian Union 
Leader: Martti Miettunen 
Tenure: July 1961–March 1962 
 
Government Party: Finnish People’s Democratic Union 
Leader: Rafael Paasio 
Tenure: February 1972–July 1972 
 
Government Party: Center; Swedish People’s Party; and Liberal 
Leader: Martti Miettunen  
Tenure: September 1976–May 1977 
 
Government Party: Finnish Social Democratic; Center; and Swedish People’s Party 
Leader: Kalevi Sorsa 
Tenure: December 1982–April 1983 
 
E.  Iceland245 
 
Government Party: Independence  
Leader: Ólafur Thors 
Tenure: December 1949–March 1950  
 
Government Party: Social Democratic  
Leader: Emil Jonsson 
Tenure: December 1958–November 1959 
 
Government Party: Social Democratic  
Leader: Emil Jonsson  
Tenure: June–November 1959 
 
Government Party: Social Democratic  
Leader: Emil Grøndahl 
Tenure: October 1979–December 1979 
 
Government Party: Social Democratic Alliance; and Left-Green Movement 
                                                          
245 STRØM, supra note 4, at 255. 
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Leader: Jóhanna Sigurðardóttir 
Tenure: February–April 2009246 
 
IV.  OTHER COUNTRIES 
 
A.  Australia 
 
Government Party: Labor Party 
Leader: Julia Gillard 
Tenure: June 2010–June 2013247  
 
B.  Canada248 
 
Government Party: Liberal  
Leader: William Lyon Mackenzie King 
Tenure: June 1945–November 1948 
 
Government Party: Progressive Conservative  
Leader: John Diefenbaker 
Tenure: June 1957–April 1958 
 
Government Party: Progressive Conservative  
Leader: John Diefenbaker 
Tenure: June 1962–April 1963 
 
Government Party: Liberal  
Leader: Lester Pearson  
Tenure: April 1963–December 1965  
 
Government Party: Liberal  
Leader: Lester Pearson 
Tenure: December 1965–April 1968 
 
Government Party: Liberal  
Leader: Pierre Trudeau 
Tenure: April–July 1968 
 
Government Party: Liberal  
Leader: Pierre Trudeau 
Tenure: November 1972–May 1974  
 
                                                          
246 Michael Ray, Jóhanna Sigurðardóttir: Prime Minister of Iceland, ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA, 
https://www.britannica.com/biography/Johanna-Sigurdardottir (last updated Nov. 23, 2015). 
247 Michael Ray, Julia Gillard: Prime Minister of Australia, ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA, 
https://www.britannica.com/biography/Julia-Gillard (last updated July 18, 2017). 
248 STRØM, supra note 4, at 248. 
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Government Party: Progressive Conservative  
Leader: Joe Clark 
Tenure: June 1979–March 1980 
 
Government Party: Liberal  
Leader: Paul Martin 
Tenure: June 2004–January 2006249 
 
Government Party: Conservative  
Leader: Stephen Harper 
Tenure: January 2006–September 2008250 
 
Government Party: Conservative  
Leader: Stephen Harper 
Tenure: October 2008251–May 2011252  
 
C.  New Zealand253 
 
Government Party: National 
Leader: Jim Bolger 
Tenure: June 1995–October 1996  
 
Government Party: National; and United New Zealand 
Leader: Jim Bolger 
Tenure: October 1996254 
 
Government Party: National; and Independent  
Leader: Jenny Shipley 
Tenure: October 1998–December 1999 
 
Government Party: Labour; and Alliance Progressive 
Leader: Helen Clark 
Tenure: December 1999–July 2002 
                                                          
249 Marc Gervais, Minority Governments in Canada: A Study of Legislative Politics 70 (2011) (unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, University of Ottawa) (on file with University of Ottowa Research), 
https://ruor.uottawa.ca/handle/10393/30141.  
250 Id. at 388–89. 
251 Id. at 389. 
252 The Conservative Party, led by Harper, won a majority in the 2011 election. Canada’s Conservatives in Crushing 
Election Victory, GUARDIAN (May 3, 2011, 1:14 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/may/03/canadian-
election-conservatives-win-majority-stephen-harper. 
253 RAYMOND MILLER, DEMOCRACY IN NEW ZEALAND 110 (2015); Seyd, supra note 66, at 19; HAZELL ET. AL 
MAKING MINORITY GOVERNMENT WORK: HUNG PARLIAMENTS AND THE CHALLENGES FOR WESTMINSTER AND 
WHITEHALL 40, fig.4.2 (Robert Hazell & Akash Paun eds., 2009), 
https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/Making%20minority%20government%20
work.pdf. 
254 Though this coalition collapsed mid-term, the National Party later joined with the New Zealand First Party and 
continued to govern with a majority. HAZELL ET. AL, supra note 245, at 38; Seyd, supra note 66, at 19. 
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Government Party: Labour; and Conservative 
Leader: Helen Clark 
Tenure: July 2002–September 2005 
 
Government Party: Labour; and Conservative  
Leader: Helen Clark 
Tenure: September 2005–November 2008 
 
Government Party: National 
Leader: John Key 
Tenure: November 2008–November 2011 
 
Government Party: National 
Leader: John Key 
Tenure: November 2011–September 2014 
 
Government Party: National 
Leader: John Key; Bill English 
Tenure: September 2014 – Present255 
 
D.  India256 
 
Government Party: Secular; People’s Party; and Supreme Akali 
Leader: Chaudhary Charan Singh 
Tenure: July 1979–August 1979 
 
Government Party: Secular; All India Anna Dravidian Progress Federation; Party of Telugu 
Land; and Indian National Congress 
Leader: Vishwanath Pratap Singh 
Tenure: December 1989–November 1990 
 
Government Party: Indian People’s Party; Army of Shivaji; and Supreme Akali 
Leader: Atal Behari Vajpayee 
Tenure: May 1996 
 
Government Party: People’s Party; Trinamool Congress; Socialist, Dravidian Progress 
Federation; Party of Telugu Land, Communist; Assam Peoples Association; and 
Maharashtrawadi Gomantak 
Leader: H.D. Deve Godwa 
Tenure: June 1996–April 1997 
 
                                                          
255 Bill English became Prime Minister when John Key unexpectedly resigned in December 2016. New Zealand PM: 
Bill English to Succeed John Key, BBC NEWS (Dec. 12, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-38285117. 
256 Sridharan, supra note 136, at 320–25. 
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Government Party: People’s Party; Trinamool Congress; Socialist; Dravidian Progress 
Federation; Party of Telugu Land; Communist; Assam Peoples Association; and 
Maharashtrawadi Gomantak 
Leader: Inder Kumar Gujral 
Tenure: April 1997–November 1997 
 
Government Party: Arunachal Congress; Indian People’s Party; Biju Janata Dal; Pattali Makkal 
Katchi; Army of Shivaji; and All India Anna Dravidian Progress Federation 
Leader: Atal Behari Vajpayee  
Tenure: March 1998–April 1999 
 
Government Party: National Congress; Indian Union Muslim League; Pattali Makkal Katchi; 
Dravidar Organization; Jharkhand Liberation Front; Telangana Rashtra Samithi; and National 
People’s Party 
Leader: Manmohan Singh 
Tenure: May 2004–March 2009 
 
Government Party: Indian National Congress; Dravidian Progress Federation; Nationalist 
Congress; and Indian Union Muslim League 
Leader: Manmohan Singh 
Tenure: May 2009–May 2014 
 
E.  Israel257 
 
Government Party: Likud; National Religious; and Peace for Zion 
Leader: Manachem Begin 
Tenure: June 1977–October 1977  
 
Government Party: Likud; National Religious; and Movement for Israel’s Tradition 
Leader: Manachem Begin 
Tenure: August 1981–September 1983 
 
Government Party: Likud; National Religious; and Movement for Israel’s Tradition 
Leader: Manachem Begin 
Tenure: October 1983–July 1984 
 
Government Party: Labor; Vigour; and Shas258 
Leader: Yitzhak Rabin, Shimon Peres259 
                                                          
257 STRØM, supra note 4, at 258–59.. 
258 The Shas withdrew from the coalition in September 1993 and were replaced by the Yiud party in January 1995. 
Factional and Government Make-Up of the Thirteenth Knesset, KNESSET, 
http://www.knesset.gov.il/history/eng/eng_hist13_s.htm (last visited Apr. 7, 2018). 
259 Peres replaced Rabin as Israel’s Prime Minister on November 4, 1995 after Prime Minister Rabin was 
assassinated. See Shimon Peres, ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/biography/Shimon-Peres 
(last visited Apr. 3, 2018). 
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Tenure: July 1992–November 1995 
F.  Japan 
Government Party: Democratic 
Leader: Tsutomu Hata 
Tenure: April 1994–June 1994260 
 
Government Party: Liberal Democratic  
Leader: Ryutaro Hashimoto 
Tenure: October 1996–July 1998261 
 
G.  Taiwan262 
Government Party: Democratic Progressive  
Leader: Chen Shui-bian (President) 
Tenure: 2000–2008 
                                                          
260 JAPAN BUSINESS LAW HANDBOOK 37 (2014). 
261 JOHN MCCORMICK, COMPARATIVE POLITICS IN TRANSITION 165 (2010).  
262 Taiwan had a divided minority government. Wu & Tsai, supra note 185, at 181.  
